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Capital never solves its crisis tendencies; it merely moves
them around. This is what theory tells us, and this is what
the history of the past 40 years has been about. (Harvey 2011,
p.11, original emphasis)
Reflections on the
governance paradigm
Twenty years ago, Bob Jessop (1998) published
a defining piece on the “rise of governance”
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and the “risks of failure”,
using the example of eco-
nomic development to frame
concerns with the nature and
shape of capitalism at that
time. This classic paper in
the social sciences undertook
four tasks. It first charted the
interest in and rise of gov-
ernance – namely the role
of markets, states, and part-
nerships in economic coor-
dination and the specifically
cyclical modes coordination
for economic development
mainly in western Europe. Second, this was sit-
uated within shifts in the practice of economic,
political, and social life and what Jessop (ibid,
p.32) called “governance practices”, such as coor-
dination, reflexivity and hierarchical forms of
organisation and state restructuring. Third, and
substantively, Jessop offered some preliminary
reflections on the nature, forms, and logic of
“governance failure”, noting alongside the quote
above from Harvey (see also Harvey 2016) that:
The growing fascination with governance mechanisms as
a solution to market and/or state failure should not lead
us to overlook the risks involved in attempts to substi-
tute governance for markets and/or hierarchies and the
resulting likelihood of governance failure. However, whilst
there are already extensive literatures on market failure
and state failure, there is far less direct, explicit, and
focused concern with governance failure. Yet, if both mar-
ket and state failure are recognized in social sciences, we
should also thematize governance failure (Jessop 1998, p.38).
Just as markets and states fail, then, Jessop’s
prediction was that governance would ultimately
fail, though the form(s) that
this would take was open-
ended at the time. As Jessop
noted in conclusion: “Given
the growing structural com-
plexity and opacity of the
social world, indeed, fail-
ure becomes the most likely
outcome of most attempts
to govern it with refer-
ence to multiple objectives
over extended spatial and
temporal horizons” (Jessop
1998, p.43). Fourth, building
on this, Jessop offered initial insights into “meta-
governance”, i.e., the governance of governance and
the state’s increasing role in managing and mis-
managing different modes of coordination. Linked
to this are four “dilemmas of governance” (ibid,
p.41) facing governance and challenges for gover-
nance researchers to uncover, namely cooperation
versus competition, openness versus closure,
governability versus flexibility, and accountabil-
ity versus efficiency. Here, Jessop sought out
the contradictions of governance, as opposed
to the complementarities expressed by Stoker
(1998).
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As I have highlighted elsewhere (Etherington
and Jones 2018; Jones 1997), the strength of Jes-
sop’s work – pitched at a high-level of abstraction
and requiring meso-level geographical and spatial
analysis – often requires others to fill in the “in
practice” gaps and take things forward theoretically
and empirically. This paper, 20 years post-Jessop
on governance and its rise and risks, offers this.
It tells the narrative of how governance in Britain
(and England specifically) has indeed marched on
and, building on Jessop (1998), has indeed failed,
repeatedly and spectacularly. The paper reveals
Jessop’s governance dilemmas in action and specif-
ically how the contradictions and crises tendencies
of capitalism have both necessitated the use of,
and been played out in and through, geographical
space. A vice of perpetual restructuring is eating
away at local economic development – where
“the whole system is paralysed by uncertainty
about who will be left standing when the game of
musical chairs comes to an end” (Mulgan 2010,
p.1) – is indeed a geographical game. In this sense,
the paper demonstrates that Jessop (1998) was
predictively right, though thinking critically about
governance vis-a`-vis space is needed to make the
connections between theory and practice. The
remaining sections of the paper unpack this.
“All change”: the governance
march across space
As noted elsewhere in detail (Jones 2019), the
evidence from this paper’s assumptions starts with
a particularly hard-hitting and historical signifi-
cant report published in 2017 by the Institute of
Government (IfG) – aptly titled All change: why
Britain is so prone to policy reinvention, and what
can be done about it – claiming that considerable
damage is being done to economic governance
by perpetual tinkering, the rationale of which is
startlingly unclear. With 28 changes to legislation
and 48 Secretaries of State in 30 years, the IfG
review looked into the now extremely rapid rate
of change to government policies and how this
had affected many sectors of governance, including
regional government, as well as industrial strategy
and further education. The reason for the changes,
or an “appalling churn” as the IfG called it, could be
put down to a number of factors, including disagree-
ment about the purpose of regional governance, or
the appropriate spatial level at which to devolve
powers and Whitehall’s unwillingness to trust exist-
ing local institutions, but opinions from documen-
tary research were uneven and inconclusive. In
short, the “constant reinvention” in these three
policy areas, noted as one of “redisorganisation”
and “accordianisation” – the need to keep everyone
confused by instituting continuous centralisation
and decentralisation – could not be adequately
explained. “In the space of just over 20 years,
the main vehicles for regional governance have
included government offices, regional assemblies,
regional development agencies and, currently, local
enterprise partnerships”, the report stated, with the
annual cost of continual reorganisation for a single
government department alone costing around £15
million a year (Norris and Adam 2017, p.3).
Put simply, IfG researchers, and a launch panel
(held on the 14 March 2017) consisting of former
Permanent Secretaries and other senior policy-
makers, did not know whether these perpetual and
cyclical changes have been taking place due to the
new policy challenges facing local and regional eco-
nomic development in the midst of globalisation,
or whether policy change is a response to repeated
policy failures, and linked to this, ad hoc political
interference vis-a`-vis ideological change without an
evidence base.
The IfG “patterns of churn” analysis is not
isolated; it builds on a key intervention offered
by the National Audit Office on the Funding and
structures of local growth. This landmark report
acknowledges that addressing uneven economic
growth between and within regions has been a focus
of government policy through governance projects
for 40 years and thus a legitimate object of state
intervention. Local “growth policy”, though, has
seen a sequence of initiatives over a number of
decades where structures and funding regimes are
often replaced by new schemes (see Fig. 1). With
some 38 changes to the landscape of economic
development since the inception of urban policy
in the early 1970s, again staggering in itself and
not explained by the authors (other than that it
represents “poor value for money”), the phase
of change in place since 2010 is deemed to be
“distinctive” because:
it has entailed the almost complete removal of existing struc-
tures and funding for local growth, both locally and regionally,
and their replacement with new structures and funding, local
freedoms and responsibilities. In contrast, previous phases of
change have tended to be incremental and overlapping. As we
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FIGURE 1. Evolution of initiatives for local growth in England, 1975–2015
Source: Pike et al. (2018, 137) based on National Audit Office (2013, 17) analysis of departmental information
have reported previously, reorganisations can be poor value
for money due to poorly specified objectives, limited cost
and benefit monitoring, and poor implementation planning.
(National Audit Office 2013, p.16).
The governance question, which Jessop (1998)
started to grapple with, is why, and in what ways,
particular policy problems are constructed and the
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processes through which spatial scales and regu-
latory governance mechanisms become codified as
the solution to such problems. It is important not
only to describe the inability of state intervention
to make a difference, given that academic and
popular analysis has highlighted the widening and
deepening of uneven development across Britain
and the extension of a north-south geographical
divide (McCann 2016). The challenge post-Jessop
(1998) is to offer “explanatory power”, i.e., to draw
attention to how seemingly unconnected processes
of state restructuring and policy formation are
in fact differentiated outcomes of ideologically
infused political decision-making that cannot be
separated from the inherent crisis tendencies and
contradictions of capital accumulation, state for-
mation, and state intervention. Put simply, as Jessop
(1998) pointed out, policy failure is not a random
and surprising phenomenon; it is the norm and
increasingly endemic to advanced capitalism and
its late neoliberalism spatial forms.
Following the entry quote from Harvey (2011),
I would like to suggest that the risk of economic
development and its governance has indeed been
continually moved around through space. Contra-
dictions necessitate displacement and geographical
transformation, but the crisis management strate-
gies of the state themselves are always subject to
new forms of crisis tendency, which points to the
always unstable nature of economic governance and
economic development. The evidence in Fig. 1 does
not point to a coherent institutional fix that supports
this neoliberal growth project, but is instead best
regarded as heterogeneous, mutable, and involv-
ing variegated responses and producing unstable
uneven geographical outcomes (Allmendinger and
Haughton 2015). Peck denotes this as governance
“failing forward” in that “manifest inadequacies
have – so far anyway – repeatedly animated fur-
ther rounds of neoliberal invention. Devolved gov-
ernance, public-private partnerships, management
by audit, neopaternalism . . . all can be seen as
examples of institutional reinvention spawned as
much by the limits of earlier forms of neoliberal-
ization as by some advancing “logic”” (Peck 2010,
pp.6–7). A framework for grappling, and putting
governance in its place, (post-Jessop 1998) firstly
requires a consideration of the relationship between
the state and space. Secondly, a long-run periodis-
ation analysis of the historical specificities, trends,
and counter-trends of state intervention through
economic development and its governance is
needed.
States, economic governance
and geoperiodisation
The most general feature of the state (pre-modern
as well as modern and pre-capitalist as well as
capitalist) is that it comprises a set of institutions
concerned with the territorialisation of political
power. This involves the intersection of politically
organised, coercive, and symbolic power, a clearly
demarcated core territory, and a fixable population
on which political decisions may be made collec-
tively binding. Thus, the key feature of the state is
the historically variable ensemble of technologies
and practices that produce, naturalise, and manage
territorial space as a relatively bounded container
within which political power is exercised to achieve
various, more or less well-integrated, and changing
policy objectives. The state, then, is distinct and
different from, say a multinational corporation, by
virtue of its territorial integrity and its political
legitimacy (see Jones 2009).
The state is also different in the various roles
that it can play. As Hudson (1989) above reminds
us, states can respond to the contradictions, dilem-
mas, and problems of capitalism by creating the
general conditions for the production and social
reproduction of the capital relation, that is, the envi-
ronment for economic growth and development.
The state does this in part by seeking to promote
growth and development and/or by responding to
the effects of this, that is, uneven growth, change,
and restructuring. The state, though, is omnipresent:
due to its development and penetration into most
spheres of life, it appears to be everywhere and
nowhere at the same time.
Following Gramsci (1971), the state is a com-
plex and broad set of institutions and networks
that span both political society and civil society
in their “inclusive” sense. Building on this insight,
states can be viewed as strategic terrains, with
emphasis being placed on strategic considerations
and strategic actions. Offe (1984, 1985) discusses
this arrangement by drawing attention to the state
and its circuits of power and policy implementa-
tion, which provides a window on the patterning
of state intervention and the everyday nature of
policy-making under capitalism. Building on Offe
and Gramsci, Jessop’s approach to the state, has
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significantly moved forward these arguments. For
Jessop (1990, 2016a), the state needs to be thought
of as “medium and outcome” of policy processes
that constitute its many interventions. The state is
both a social relation and a producer of strategy
and, as such, it does not have any power of its own.
State power in relation to the policy process relates
to the forces that “act in and through” its apparatus.
According to this view, attempts to analyse the
policy process need to uncover the strategic con-
texts, calculations, and practices of actors involved
in strategically selective, or privileged, sites. This
can be summarised as a framework that demon-
strates “systems analyses” for the undertaking of
“systematic” forms of public policy analysis –
drawing attention to the intricate links between
actors and forms of representation, institutions and
their interventions and practices, and the range of
policy outcomes available. The state, then, is both a
strategic and relational concern, forged through the
ongoing engagements between agents, institutions
and concrete policy circumstances.
Rhodes (2007, p.1254) reminds us that “pat-
terns of rule arise as the contingent products of
diverse actions and political struggles informed by
the beliefs of agents as they confront dilemmas that
are understood differently in contending traditions”
(emphasis added). Heeding this call, two crucial
elements of statehood and policy-making need to
be considered. The first is the notion of “discursive
geographies” (Jones 2008). This encourages us to
think of the state as not “always-already there”: the
relationship between states, ideology and discourse
matters in and through the production, dissemi-
nation and consumption of ideas and concepts to
understand the whereabouts of state intervention
and public policy. As the evidence above (Fig. 1)
documents, new institutions are continually being
built by the state and cadres of “experts” strate-
gically assembled that can be proposed as the
appropriate caretakers, teachers, and practitioners
of knowledge. As knowledge is transferred though
“from one scale to another, the particular social,
political, and economic context within which it
was produced is stripped away, allowing the pre-
sentation of abstract programmatic statements that
are valorised as universally applicable” (Dixon and
Hapke 2003, p.143).
Second, the “geography of discourse” (Jones
2008) itself matters, i.e., the way objects of regu-
lation and governance are constituted in relation
to each other. The construct of policy does not
stand independently from the ideas and beliefs of
politicians and policy-makers, but has to be always
contextualised in relation to concepts and ideas
that are unstated. For Dixon and Hapke (2003,
p.143), the state is able to establish this line “via
the play of binaries for example, free/fettered,
family/corporate, rural/urban, welfare/investment,
safety/risk, individual/ social, us/them – one side
of each of which becomes prioritized to the detri-
ment of its opposite” (Dixon and Hapke 2003,
p.143). Jessop and Sum (2013) deploy the notions
of “semiosis” and “construal” to combine these
twin insights. Semiosis refers to sense-making and
meaning-making, whereby policy-makers can give
appreciation and meaning to their actions world,
which is in turn predicted on “construal” – how a
particular policy problem is perceived and the solu-
tion constructed in response to this. Put very simply:
“Policy makers are not faced with a given problem.
Instead they have to identify and formulate their
problem” (Lindbolm 1968, p.13). The governance
of economic development is no exception here and
the nature of the problem and the solutions to this
have changed considerably over time and across
space – perpetually in a state of flux, as noted above.
These concerns can be further rolled together
through the idea of “spatial fixes” (Harvey 2011,
2016) and “spatio-temporal fixes” (see Jessop
2016a,b), concepts deployed to comprehend the
dynamics of state spatiality, state spatial restruc-
turing, and the geographies of state intervention
specifically. The state performs the role of securing
the relative stabilisation of society by endeavour-
ing to manage the various economic and political
contradictions within the state system. This is
inherently spatial, as state intervention is articu-
lated through the constructions of spaces (scales,
levels, horizons, etc.) of intervention, the fixing of
borders, the stabilisation of places, and in short,
attempts are being continually made to produce and
reproduce a territorially coherent and functioning
socioeconomic landscape. This has been referred
to elsewhere as state “spatial selectivity” – the
processes of spatial privileging and articulation in
and through which state policies are differentiated
across territorial space in order to target particular
geographical zones, scales, and interest groups
(Jones 1997).
The latter dimension forms an integral ele-
ment of how legitimation occurs within the state
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apparatus via the creation of territorial coalitions, or
what Cox (1998) calls “spaces of engagement”, to
mobilise strategically significant actors and exclude
others where “spaces of dependency” (interests and
attachments) rule out their possibility for incor-
poration. The tension between engagement and
dependency, of course, creates a politics of scale and
a scaling of politics, where some localities are either
more or less engaged in networks of association
beyond their immediate territories than are others
(see Jonas and Wood 2012).
As noted previously (Jones 2009), Brenner’s
(1998, pp.474–477) work on state spatiality offers
a useful geo-periodisation bridge to take this for-
ward and situate the rise and increasing risks of
governing economic development. Brenner draws
attention to three periods: “encagement” (1890s–
1930s), “entrenchment” (1950s–early 1970s), and
“de-nationalisation” (post-1970s onwards). This is
applied to the British economic development expe-
rience, to put governance in its place.
Space of localism: municipal local states
Taking these in turn, until the late nineteenth
century there was a distinct polarisation between
industrialising city-regions and predominately rural
agricultural peripheries, which was reinforced at
a global scale through colonialism and imperialist
expansion. The global depression of the late 1890s
and after, however, drove a search for a state-
managed and organised capitalism. With the devel-
opment of market societies, “states were forced
to adopt measures to prevent the self-destruction
to which self-adjusting markets were inclined”
(Dunford and Perrons 1992, p.391). An emerging
“encagement” of socio-economic relations was tak-
ing place due to the increasing spatial convergence
between the interests of capital and the state, which
fueled the development of global urban hierarchies
and increasingly territorial states (Brenner 1998,
p.473). Geo-economic interests began to dominate
here and the continued expansion of capital growth
and development drove the search for a spatial sym-
metry between a national economy, state bureau-
cracy, civil society, and national culture, all feeding
each other. This was secured through mainly public
infrastructure development across territorial space,
industrial infrastructures, national economic plan-
ning, and an expanding state apparatus.
Over a 40-year period, the state thus acquired
an increasing role in the construction of numer-
ous interlocking territorial infrastructures – public
transportation, education and housing facilities,
communication networks, utility supplies, and other
aspects of the expanding urban and regional fabric –
as market mechanisms of distribution had failed as
mechanisms of production and modernisation. Eco-
nomic development trajectories in England broadly
align to this. Victorian “localist” public health leg-
islation, for instance, made possible the expansion
of the (local) state’s roles in responsibility for water
and sanitation through a combination of local tax-
ation and municipal trading. The context for these
local rounds of state intervention was “countering
localized market failure” (Hall 2016, p.313) and as
the nineteenth century progressed, other services
were developed in a similar way, including gas,
electricity and public transport.
Spatial Keynesianism: national welfare
states
Following the Great Depression of the 1930s, and
certainly after the Second World War, this model of
statehood was consolidated through modernisation,
nationalisation, and rationalisation to make space
for a new wave of capitalist expansion, despite
the onset of serious and lasting economic crises.
Britain, for instance, faced growing international
competition and local authorities experienced eco-
nomic problems that precipitated engagements with
industrial promotion activity, which accelerated in
the inter-war years. As Mawson points out:
The fact that the burden of addressing the social consequences
of mass unemployment was borne at the local level through
poor relief further encouraged local municipal leadership to
promote the local economy and associated tax base. In some
areas this development took places as an adjunct to central
government’s emerging regional policies as heralded in the
1934 Special Area Act. (Mawson 2009, p.40).
These emerging regional policies were seeking to
deal with the problems of uneven development and
rising spatial inequality between a growing south
and declining north. Consequently, throughout the
Fordist–Keynesian period, roughly from the 1950s
to the early 1970s, the role of the territorial state
as a geographical container of capital accumulation
and social development intensified and solidified
(Brenner 1998, p.474). From the 1930s, states had
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begun to engage directly in attempts to influence
capital through subsidies, grants, loans, tax advan-
tages, public investments, and state ownership of
production facilities. In Britain, for instance, the
Barlow Commission of 1937–1940 was a landmark
event, which placed a national duty on government
to govern, control capital to prevent the overheating,
and socialise national control of industry through
planning (see Hall 1989).
This practice of capital regulation and spatially
targeted investment progressed through rounds
of regional policy, such as the Local Author-
ities (Land) Act 1963 and The National Plan,
with regional and local state institutions becoming
“transmission belts” for interventionist central state
policies concerned with addressing “the balance of
payments [via] an intensive effort by all concerned”
(HMSO 1965, p.A3). Their goal was simultane-
ously to maximise growth by “overcoming the
obstacles to growth” (ibid) and to redistribute its
effects as evenly as possible on a national scale.
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, further rounds
of regional (industrial) policies, such as the Hunt
report on intermediate areas, were introduced to
promote industrialisation within each state’s under-
developed peripheries. The spaces mostly outside of
declining cities became hosts to industrial estates,
employment parks, and other exhibits of fixed-
capital investment to attract jobs through inward
investment, as well as growing (often failing)
local/regional economic talent. This was supported
by the expansion of the welfare state, increasing
universal rights and social citizenship, and poli-
tics predominately related to achieving and raising
social benefits. In this style, “the national scale
operated as the critical geographical framework for
capitalist production and exchange, as the dominant
institutional site of sociospatial polarisation, and as
the most central arena for addressing sociopolitical
contestation” (Brenner 1998, p.475).
The crises and contradictions of capitalism
were in effect delicately balanced, or what Dunsire
(1993) calls “collibrated”, into a durable spatio-
temporal fix. As Lefebvre (1976, p.111) puts it:
“the ship of capitalism and its leaders found itself
with a motor, a rudder and a fixed course”. The
limits to this became apparent during the mid-1970s
with the slowing down then collapse of Atlantic-
Fordism. Key for Britain was social and political
unrest, with the government responding with the
raft of state interventions on urban policy ignited by
the 1977 Urban White Paper and 1978 Inner Urban
Areas Act, where “local economic development
was encouraged by the policy vacuum created by
the retreat of national regional policy in areas of
increasing unemployment and by the introduction
of locally delivered national schemes such as the
Urban Programme” (Mawson 2009, p.41).
De-nationalisation scalar relativisation:
new localism and new regionalism
Consequently, “de-nationalisation” (Brenner 1998,
p.475) has had more profound implications on
geography of world capitalism and the political
economic geography of the state than the two
preceding waves of spatio-temporal fixing. Shifts
within the international division of labour, aided by
technical change, brought about intense economic
restructuring, which transformed some industrial
heartlands into wastelands and provided new
post-industrial opportunities for others. Accord-
ingly, on sub-state levels, “interspatial competition”
(Brenner 1998, p.475) has intensified among local-
ities competing with one another to attract invest-
ment and secure state subsidies. In addition to these
globally induced reconfigurations of the national
scale, there has been a series of highly contested
forms of reterritorialisation involving the state
and its interventions, restructuring impacts, and
responses to this. Two overarching broad trends
have been defining social science research agendas
in recent years.
First, scholars have highlighted a “relativi-
sation of statehood” (Collinge 1999). In contrast
to the era of Fordism–Keynesianism, described
above, there is no privileged level around which
the state can influence the unfolding of capitalism.
The relativisation of statehood thus implies: (1)
an increasingly tangled hierarchy of overlapping,
continually changing arrangements associated with
multilevel interventions; and (2) the systematic lack
of any dominant scale, or system of governance,
that encompasses or subsumes competing scales
of political-economic organisation. To understand
this, the crisis of Fordist capitalism and the subse-
quent burst of globalisation should be understood
as a de-centering of nationally scaled regulatory
arrangements, as subnational and supranational
scales of political-economic life have acquired
a renewed, and in some cases unprecedented,
significance through a variety of trial-and-error,
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often ad hoc, political initiatives, especially in
economic development and regeneration. This often
involves the shift from government to governance,
as new arrangements for state management now
involve an array of different socioeconomic partners
and not just those in formalised state structures.
Figure 1 captures some of this, with an
increasingly relativisation of scale and an almost
“filling-in” (Goodwin et al. 2017) of all horizons
(national, regional, local) of state intervention.
While the Keynesian welfare national states of
the post-war era were intent to harmonise the
equalisation of wealth, population, and infras-
tructure across national territories, contemporary
neoliberal state projects are promoting territorial
competitiveness within certain strategic subna-
tional sites such as cities, city-regions, and indus-
trial districts, which in turn are to be positioned
within supranational and global circuits of eco-
nomic development. While certain aspects of this
entrepreneurial reorientation of governance has
occurred from below, as fiscally strained localities
have attempted proactively to attract new sources of
investment through the actions of “new institutional
spaces” (Jones1999), sub-national economic devel-
opment must also be construed as a national state
projects concerned with providing “new avenues
for capital accumulation” (Hadjimachalis 2018,
p.xii).
Second, provoked by hegemonic discourses of
globalisation and business civilisation alongside a
political rhetoric of fiscal prudence, national states
have actively sought to reduce commitments to
integrated welfare entitlements and redistributive
urban and regional policies in favour of supply-side
neoliberal initiatives intended to promote techno-
logical innovation, labour market flexibility, lean
management, and endogenous growth. This is dis-
cussed further below.
In governance terms, Metropolitan County
Councils were accordingly abolished in Britain,
reflecting central government’s hostility to their
deemed to be socialist interventionist range of
economic development policies, and “new local-
ist” state-sponsored institutions, such as Urban
Development Corporations (UDCs) and TECs (see
Jones 1999), put in their place. The “patchwork
quilt” (Audit Commission 1989) of local complex-
ities was replaced by a “new regionalist” “bowl
of spaghetti” (Johnstone and Whitehead 2004) of
responding to new market opportunities through
new forms of organisational capacity and business
leadership through Regional Development Agen-
cies (RDAs), working in tandem with, but also
getting tangled up with, Local Learning and Skills
Councils. In the words of the Lord Peyton of
Yeovil, criticising the government’s Neighbour-
hood Renewal Unit at that time:
The organization has no fewer than seven divisions and 14
subdivisions. Its habit of breeding which is endemic in the
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, has spread to boroughs.
The government has produced an indissoluble union between
gobbledy and gook. (Quoted in Weaver 2003, p.17).
Local Strategic Partnerships (LSCs) and later a
series of Area-Agreements (Local then Multiple
AAs) were deployed so that local stakeholders
could work together to agree and deliver local
policy priorities, but limited statutory powers and
minuscule budgets, the government’s increasingly
performance management regime for government
programmes largely bypassed the new structures
and added to the existing complexity, which is evi-
dent by the rapidity of institutional developments in
Fig. 1, culminating ultimately in what Sullivan and
Skelcher (2002) refer to as a “congested state” in
which a “considerable amount of time and resources
are chewed up in getting new organisations off the
ground and in constructing partnership relations so
that something might get done” (Corry and Stoker
2003, p.10, emphasis added).
New new localism: devolution deals and
beyond
The resulting spatio-temporal fix to deal with this
dysfunctional multi-scalar complexity increasingly
became a “new new localism” of city regions
(Jones and Jessop 2010), given the desire to cre-
ate institutional projects able to hold down the
global through functional economic areas. The
HM Treasury Sub-National Review (SNR) had
proposed Urban Regeneration Companies (URCs)
and sub-regions became key spatial units in
increasingly devolved contexts (see Ayers and
Stafford 2009). Post 2010, a Devolution and
Local Government Act and Local Growth agenda
pushed functional economic areas further through
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), City Deals
and Devolution Deals. The RSA’s City Growth
Commission represented a key moment, leashing
metro-growth, through a series of city-regions, or
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“metros” – defined as the “larger constellation
of cities and towns that constitute a functional
economy within built up areas” (RSA 2014, p.11)
– with critics noting this city-region building as
adding further to the tangled problem of governance
complexity; nothing short of an imbroglio of insti-
tutional crises that reproduces the labour market’s
deep inequalities by focusing only on the most prof-
itable and high-tech sectors of the local and regional
economy (Etherington and Jones 2016a). While
the principal function of local authorities was the
concern with public services, merging LEPs with
local government through the various Combined
Authorities and Mayoral CAs, twisted and turned
the function of the local state towards the ideo-
logical and principal purpose of economic growth
and also depoliticised debates around this. Critical
here is the ongoing process of joining up economic
development with the market-making and welfare
reform agenda (see Toynbee and Walker 2017),
given the surface-level policy desire to have locally
sensitive and coordinated approaches (Mawson
2009), drawing on the lessons of the Employment
Zones and City Strategy Pathfinders.
Consequently, noting what Peck (2010, p.16)
calls “state/market configurations”, these activities
have been bringing with them “authoritarian pol-
itics”, that is, they can have deep consequences
across cities and regions, as inherited and hard-
won forms of popular control over welfare state
institutions are being gradually eroded. Insofar
as they have entailed a “productivist” re-ordering
of social policy and the increasing privileging of
economic competitiveness, shifts to entrepreneurial
governance have also contributed to a reduced com-
mitment to the concerns of collective consumption
for poorer sections of the working class. For Harvey
(2005, p.76) “a way has been found to integrate
state decision-making into the dynamics of capital
accumulation and the networks of class power”.
Accordingly, the move from RDAs to LEPs effec-
tively removed two-thirds of core regeneration and
ended the 40-year history of area-based regenera-
tion initiatives “targeted at the most deprived parts
of England” (Crowley et al. 2012; Hetherington
2013). As Hall summarises:
. . . the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats have pre-sided
over the effective cessation of urban regeneration as a form
of public policy. Legacy programmes have been allowed to
expire without replacement or, in the case of Housing Market
Renewal, simply terminated. Total government expenditure
on regeneration was reduced by some two-thirds within the
financial year 2011/2012. For the first time since the 1960s,
there is no national framework of area based regeneration
initiatives and supporting financial and institutional resources
in the cities of England . . . Indeed, it can be argued that the
Coalition government has rejected a role for itself in respect of
the monitoring and elimination of poverty and social exclusion.
(Hall 2016, p.324, emphasis added).
New forms of exclusion, subordination, and resis-
tance are being inscribed into urban and regional
space (Ellis and Henderson 2013). One notable
ingredient in this political endeavour has been esca-
lating welfare-to-work or “workfare” interventions,
which aim to secure a new relationship between the
state and its subjects by requiring work or active
labour-market activities in return for unemploy-
ment benefit and welfare assistance. The discussion
on the rollout of Universal Credit, which involves
replacing six means-tested benefits for working-age
households, is the culmination of this regime, with
the National Audit Office (2018) raising serious
questions on the operability of a system that is
causing hardship and misery for thousands.
Reconciling governance,
neoliberalism, and its spatial
conditions
This neoliberal growth strategy should neither be
seen as an all-encompassing, universal and settled
project, nor a binary process of switching one spa-
tial scale with another (local-regional and regional-
local). In the words of Brenner et al.:
To speak of neoliberalism “in crisis” needless to say, pre-
supposes an understanding of the character of this elusively
dispersed yet deeply embedded form of social rule. A sin-
gular, monolithic and unified neoliberalism might indeed be
prone to a correspondingly “total” crisis. But neoliberal-
ism has never displayed such a singular, monolithic char-
acter. It may be deeply integrated, but it has always been
unevenly developed – most notable across nations, cities and
regions . . . [N]eoliberalism’s proven capacities in the (down-
ward and outward) displacement and (forward) resheduling of
risks and crisis tendencies mean that its associated regulatory
landscapes are especially dynamic. (2012, pp.17–18)
It is important, then, to highlight the contingent
“mechanisms” or “processes” in and through which
this project is being politically made and contested
with “some forms of agency” to avoid “over gener-
alisations” (Le Gales 2016, p.168). Following Offe
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(1984, p.37), a “processual” approach is favoured
here, which seeks out the mechanisms (“cross-
scalar relations” as Brenner et al. (2012, p.60,
original emphasis) put it) that generate events
and can highlight developmental tendencies and
tease out important counteracting tendencies and
opportunities for progressive localisms.
Instances of regulatory failure across cities
and regions, though, are becoming apparent, as
state policy-making constantly switches economic
problems in concerns of state rationality that can
be more easily addressed through public policy.
State actors appear to be continually reinventing
policy initiatives, often in response to the problems
and contradictions caused by previous rounds of
state intervention, in a search to get things right. As
Brenner et al. put it,
the practice of neoliberal statecraft is inescapably, and pro-
foundly, marked by compromise, calculation and contradic-
tion. There is no blueprint. There is not even a map. Crises
themselves need not be fatal for this mutable, mongrel model
of governance, for to some degree or another neoliberalism has
always been a creature of crisis. But selectively exploiting the
crisis of Keynesian-welfarist, developmental or state-socialist
systems is one thing, responding to crises of neoliberalism’s
own making is quite another. (2012, p.45)
How are state actors dealing with these challenges?
How is failure being presented and interpreted,
addressed, and new solutions proposed? Provisional
answers to these big questions, post-Jessop (1998),
are below.
Multispatial metagovernance and the
geographies of economic development
As pendulum swing effect has been experienced
in the governance fields of local and regional eco-
nomic development, whereby UK state strategy, in
turn linked to how the policy problem is constructed
and its solution articulated, has moved and oscil-
lated between national, regional, and local patterns
of state projects and modes of state interventions.
The previous round of state spatial restructuring has
been used as the explanation for state intervention
failure, with the next round seeking to address
this through developing new spatial horizons, also
failing in turn. Policy actors, politicians and busi-
ness leaders are locked into the market model of
delivery, neoliberalising modes of representation
and subsequent failures in economic regulation.
Local and regional economic and social develop-
ment has a “deficit in local regulatory capacity” and
some state forms and functions have clearly become
“counter-regulatory” (Painter and Goodwin 2000).
Governance failure (a response to both state failure
and market failure), i.e., the “failure to redefine
objectives in the face of continuing disagreement
about whether they are still valid for the various
partners” (Jessop 2000, p.18), is occurring.
There are a number of dimensions to gover-
nance failure, which are embedded in economic
development (see Etherington and Jones 2016a,
2018). First, is the apparent tension between devolv-
ing responsibilities in relation to policy forma-
tion and implementation and the tendency towards
centralisation in decision-making, whereby local
actors are charged with implementing nationally
determined targets and programmes. The challenge
here is the adaptation of national programmes to
local conditions.
Second is the increasing tendency towards
institutional and policy fragmentation at the sub-
regional level, with issues of accountability being
raised. Governance becomes a new site for con-
flicts and political mobilisation, as the nature and
complexity of partnerships means that involvement
of more and more “actors” and “stakeholders”
involved in the design and delivery of labour market
programmes. Outcomes at one scale may be depen-
dent upon performance at another scale of gover-
nance, therefore coordination dilemmas can occur.
Furthermore, these coordination mechanisms may
have different “temporal horizons” and there may
be continuous tensions between short-term and
long-term planning goals in policy planning.
Third, and related, is the failure of current
policies to address deep-rooted problems of labour
market inequalities that are integral to market
failure. This is exemplified in many localities by
the employment gap and lack of sufficient sus-
tainable employment growth to “revitalise” city-
region economies. Finally, governance in the form
of economic partnerships, dominated by private
sector interests, is continuing to replace elected and
representative government in terms of local eco-
nomic development, which in itself poses a number
of problems between government and its elected
representation model of democracy and partner-
ships, and which tend to be elite-forming with
blurred lines of accountability, often far removed
from those who are disadvantaged and disenfran-
chised. Depoliticisation is occurring, as opaque
C© 2019 The Authors International Social Science Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The march of governance and the actualities of failure 35
representational structure and lines of accountabil-
ity close down and restrict possibilities of negoti-
ation and contestation (see Etherington and Jones
2018).
As noted by Bakker (2010), these processes
have been neither “tidy in practice” nor “linear in
fashion”: market failures, state failures and gover-
nance failures coexist, “exhibit a range of failures”,
and are used to justify the “problem” requiring on-
going state intervention. It is, therefore, important to
consider notions of “crisis metamorphosis”. When
talking about financial crises, but also relevant to
economic crisis in general, Thompson distinguishes
this from the approach of Harvey (above) and
Habermas by insisting that:
Metamorphosis implies a change in form; it does not imply, as
displacement does, that the crisis has moved from one sphere
of social life to another. A financial crisis that metamorphoses
into a political crisis or a social crisis does not necessarily cease
to be a financial crisis: it simply becomes something else. It
changes form and, in doing so, it becomes something more
than a financial crisis per se, taking on new characteristics in
the process. (Thompson 2013, pp.64–65, original emphasis)
Moreover, as forms of governance become more
widespread and constantly change their form (meta-
morphosis) “the question of governance failure
becomes more acute” (Bakker 2010, p.45). The
state’s answer to governance failure is to develop
forms of metagovernance, which involves attempts
to manage the ongoing complexity, plurality and
tangled hierarchies characteristic of prevailing
modes of coordination (see Jessop 1998, 2000,
2008, 2015, 2016). It involves, then, continually
defining and redefining boundary-spanning roles
and functions, creating and recreating networking
and linkage devices, sponsoring and redesigning
new institutions, identifying appropriate lead strate-
gic institutions to coordinate other partners and
continually generating discourses and narratives on
the economy (the “shaping of context”, according
to Jessop, 2011) to facilitate relative geograph-
ical coherence through repetition of the “prob-
lems” to be addressed and the solutions to these
(metamorphosis played out). Government plays an
increasing role in metagovernance: providing the
ground rules for governance and regulatory order in
and through which governance partners can pursue
their aims and seek to ensure the compatibility or
coherence of different governance mechanisms and
regimes; seeking to balance and rebalance power
differentials by strengthening weaker forces or
systems in the interest of social cohesion or inte-
gration; and providing political responsibility in the
event of governance failure (Etherington and Jones
2016a; Whitehead 2003). These emerging roles
means that networking, negotiation, noise reduc-
tion and negative as well as positive coordination
occur “in the shadow of hierarchy”. It also means
that, as Jessop reminds us, there is “the need for
almost permanent institutional and organizational
innovation to maintain the very possibility (however
remote) of sustained economic growth” (Jessop
2000, p.24). Economic development initiatives are
thus frequently produced through a combination of
political fiat, central government diktat and local
state opportunism.
Effective governance and metagovernance, in
turn, depends on displacing (via the metamorphosis
of the problem and its solution) certain governance
problems elsewhere and/or on deferring them into
a more or less remote future. This is possible
because the state can transform its own internal
structures and patterns of intervention spatially in
an attempt to temporarily reconcile the contra-
dictions inherent in its involvement in economy
and society (Hudson 2001). Whereas the positively
charged policy context of government policy points
to a can-do “steering optimism”, where there is
deemed to be a capacity to engage fruitfully and
with purpose to produce temporary spatio-temporal
fixes, Fig. 1 demonstrates a “steering pessimism”
and a “crisis of crisis-management” (Offe 1984).
State intervention has come to operate not only as
a political strategy for promoting local economic
development, but also as a form of crisis manage-
ment designed to manage the regulatory deficits,
dislocations, and conflicts induced through earlier
rounds of state spatial restructuring. In short:
. . . a crisis-induced recalibration has been unfolding since the
mid-1990s [whereby] a rescaled layer of state spatial projects
and state spatial strategies has been forged whose purpose is
to confront some of the major regulatory failures generated
through state intervention. (Brenner 2004, p.266).
In turn, there are structural economic obstacles
to effective governance and metagovernance, that,
“by virtue of the simplication of the conditions
of action, so often lead to the ‘revenge’ of prob-
lems that get ignored, marginalized, displaced, or
deferred” (Jessop 2011, p.117). Fig. 2 summarises
the key dimensions of this conceptualisation of
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FIGURE 2. The geographical political economy of crisis spaces
Source: author’s analysis
crisis and contradiction theory and points to the
importance of the accumulation of, and inescapable
intensification of, the unresolved contradictions of
doing local and regional economic development.
Brenner (2004, pp.263–265) neatly summarises
these as the outstanding problems of: ineffi-
ciency and waste; chronic short-termism; reg-
ulatory undercutting; increasing uneven spatial
development and territorial conflicts; problems of
inter-scalar and inter-territorial coordination;
democratic accountability and legitimation prob-
lems. For Fuller and Geddes, this gambit of reg-
ulatory problems and crisis tendencies ultimately
revolves around:
tensions between nation-state control of urban regulatory
spaces and local autonomy and discretion; the challenges
created by the focus on “joining up” agents in urban spaces
for purposes of addressing deprivation; and issues around the
extent to which communities and citizens have the capacity
to lead and influence governance arrangements within the
context of devolved responsibility. (Fuller and Geddes 2008,
p.266).
The solution to metagovernance failure is the state’s
ability to further undertake, through acts of spatial
movement and geographical displacement, mul-
tispatial metagovernace (MSMG). According to
Jessop (2016b), MSMG recognises the complex,
reciprocal, and independence of several spatio-
temporal social fields that the state can draw on to
frame its modes of intervention and policy-making
capacities. The basis of this rests on earlier work
with colleagues on the “TPSN schema” (denoting
the concepts of territory, place, scale, and network),
which explored the interaction between these four
spatial moments of social relations considered both
as structuring principles and as fields of socio-
spatial organisation (see Jessop et al. 2008). These
moments of socio-spatiality, which seek to go
beyond analysis of the state in one dimension, can
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be combined to produce more concrete–complex
analyses of particular socio-spatial configurations,
tied to specific substantive relations and processes,
and articulated in different kinds of state spatial
strategy to intervene in the economy. Each socio-
spatial organising principle, then, has its own
forms of inclusion–exclusion and entails differen-
tial capacities to exercise state powers. This opens
a strategic field in which social forces seek to
privilege different modes of socio-spatial organi-
sation to privilege their ideal and material interests.
Moreover, strategies of crisis resolution involve
attempts to reorder the relative importance of the
four dimensions and their associated institutional
expressions and, hence, to modify the weight of
their role in displacing crisis tendencies and con-
tradictions – moving them around as Harvey (2011)
put it.
Table 1 accordingly summarises how all the
spatial combinations have been used as sites for
doing local and regional economic and social devel-
opment over the past 40 years. A discernible shift
can be noted, whereby: place–place state spatial
strategies of the Victorians’ localist era existed;
territory–place strategies of the spatial Keyensian
welfarist era replaced this regulatory fix; place–
network and scale–network forms of neoliberal
state intervention were dominant the new local-
ism and new regionalism; and network–place state
spatial strategies are the preferred face of the new
new localism. This generalisation, though similar
to other European experiences (see Batchler et al.
2017; Piatonni and Polverari 2016), conceals some
of the relativisation tendencies at work (see above).
In terms of metagovernance, competing and rivalled
socio-spatial strategies have existed and co-exist.
Attempts to rebalance the relative weight of the
socio-spatial configurations, illustrated by the state
project descriptions in these cells, have indeed
failed to create a stable economic and social com-
promise – instead, “intensify[ing] uneven develop-
ment, especially when declining regions are blamed
for their own decline, required to make themselves
attractive to capital based on mobilizing their own
resources, or left to rot” (Jessop 2018, p.7).
Instead, a lack of symmetry exists between
the “spatial division of labour” (Massey 1984) –
put simply, the geographical organisation of rela-
tionships on production and accumulation – and
the “spatial division of the state” – put simply,
the relationships horizontally and vertically within
and between forms of regulation and governance.
Moreover, these two divisions are interrelated, as
“[v]ariations in the role of the state are a result
of a number of factors, including the structure
of industry, administrative organisation, and the
character of the ruling political coalition” (Dunford
and Perrons 1992, p.391). Building on the notion
of “regulatory capacity”, the state, then, is part
and parcel of the coordination deficit dilemma of
economic development as a result of a problem
of “territorial non-correspondence” as Cox (2008,
p.342) puts it: the desire and need to have com-
petence, influence, and control is out of reach and
exceeded by capacities occurring at other territorial
scales. The answer is not to make every instance
remaking economic development an act of coter-
minous boundary drawing (cf. HCLG 2018; Ney
2017), but to challenge the fundamental spatial and
geographical logic of the British growth model and
the ways in which the forces of capital actively help
to produce and reproduce combined and uneven
development.
Coda: Brexit impedimenta
and the revenges of uneven
development
This paper has suggested that the growth of gover-
nance is interlinked with neoliberal modes of state
intervention, driven by absorbing market failures
into the state apparatus, which in turn leads to
state and governance failures in new, and old, insti-
tutional and spatial forms. Elsewhere it has been
suggested that this would lead to an “impedimenta
state” (Jones 2010) – the capitalist state with bag-
gage, ambivalence, and disorientation, increasingly
weighed down by policy journeys travelled in local
and regional economic development. In situations
of crisis management, the best that policy-makers
can hope for is a series of temporary and temporal
“crisis spaces” (Hadjimichalis 2018) of conflict
resolution, which can only stall crises for limited
moments, as the accumulation of unsolved con-
tradictions mounts up to impedimenta proportions.
The state has baggage and is increasingly bag-like
in its appearance, actions, and reactions. The trouble
with bags, though, is that they demand to be filled,
and impedimenta, like some parasitic virus, seem
to rapidly replicate geographically. The evidence
provided here points to the state carrying its crisis
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TABLE 1. The multispatial metagovernance of economic development
←Structuring principles→
↑Structuring fields↓ Territory Place Scale Network
Territory Territorialisation of
local authorities,
creation of local
state institutions
(e.g., TECs, LEPs)
Management of
uneven
development,
integrating places
into a territory (e.g.,
urban programme)
Spatial Keynesianism,
coordinating
different scales
(e.g., regional/
urban development
policy)
Multi-area
government and
governance, (e.g.,
Government
Offices for the
Regions, Combined
Authorities
Place Land-based agencies
with zonal-extent
(e.g., UDCs, EZs,
English
partnerships,
URCs)
Designating towns
and cities,
contiguous regions
and city-regions
Glocalisation,
glurbanisation,
urban-global
inter-relationships
Local, urban, regional
governance
partnerships (e.g.,
Single
Regeneration
Budget, City
Challenge, LSPs,
LAAs, MAAs)
Scale Filling-in of
administrative
functions: Unitary,
District, Borough
institutions
Twinning
arrangements,
local-global
linkages
Soft or fuzzy spaces,
non-contiguous
City Regions (Core
City and Key City
networks
Nested or tangled
scalar projects (e.g.,
RDAs, regional
assemblies)
Network Spatial imaginaries,
virtual, relational,
and cross-border
regions (e.g.,
Northern
Powerhouse,
Midlands Engine)
Polycentric cities and
multi-city
regionalism,
deal-making policy
(e.g., city deals,
devolution deals,
sector deals)
Private international
regimes, providers
of state services
(e.g., work and
health programme,
transport
infrastructures)
Fast-policy transfers,
networks of
networks
(e.g.,Business
Improvement
Districts)
Source: adaption and application of Jessop et al. (2008: Table 2)
legacies over time, which like a rucksack is getting
heavier and weighing down policy-making abilities.
This is being derived from the state responding to
problems caused by its own interventions, attempt-
ing to leave behind accumulated policy legacies,
such that the state has become irrational and a site of
and for bureaucratic ponderousness in and through
administrative inertia and modes of negative coordi-
nation. As predicted some 50 years ago, not dealing
with this was predicted to result in both problems
of “state rationality” and also a “legitimation crisis”
(Offe 1985).
The authoritarian actions of the state cannot resolve either
old or new contradictions; they try to evade their impact by
reducing problems and possibilities. By utilizing for this irra-
tional and specialized – i.e. reduced and reductive – activities,
political action pretending to totality becomes itself reduced
and reductive. This gives rise to new contradictions. (Lefebvre
1969, p.136, emphasis removed).
The 23 June 2016 vote in Britain to “Brexit”
the European Union was in large part driven by
those in distressed rust-belt post-industrial areas,
seemingly trapped within an impedimenta “geog-
raphy of discontent” (Los et al. 2017; MacLeod
and Jones 2018), lacking confidence in metropoli-
tan politicians and policy-makers to manage the
economy and society through the various rounds of
industrial restructuring-induced economic develop-
ment projects and governance endeavours over the
past 40 years. In Elliott’s eyes:
. . . old industrial Britain is still suffering from the conse-
quences of the closure of factories and pits three or four decades
ago. These communities have higher levels of unemployment
and higher concentrations of people on disability benefit, and
have suffered much more grievously from government welfare
cuts. Unsurprisingly, they were also strongly in favour of leave.
North of the line that runs from the Severn estuary to the
Wash, Brexit was the culmination of a 40-year process of de-
industrialisation and casualization of work. It was a protest
about dead-end jobs, and about run-down communities being
lorded over by London, talked down and bossed around. (Elliott
2017, p.12).
This is the “revenge of the places that don’t
matter” as Rodrı´guez-Pose (2018, p.189) puts it.
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British economic development does not have to
be this way. The challenge from Jessop’s land-
mark paper becomes how “participants must recog-
nise the likelihood of failure but proceed as is
success were possible” so that economic devel-
opment retains elements of economic and social
value (1998, pp.43–44). I would urge scholars to
still consider alternative pathways to this crisis
end-point by, firstly, engaging with contemporary
analyses of inclusive growth (see Lee 2018), and
secondly, bring back to the fore the “negotiated”
model of economic governance historically found
in Denmark (Etherington and Jones 2004), which
I argue remains valid for addressing the contradic-
tions of neoliberalism and the governance crises
facing our cities and regions. Thank you Bob
Jessop (1998) for being the inspiration for two
decades of scholarship on social and economic
governance.
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